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This study compared pilot situation awareness across three traffic management concepts. The Concepts 
varied in terms of the allocation of traffic avoidance responsibility between the pilot on the flight deck, the 
air traffic controllers, and a conflict resolution automation system. In Concept 1, the flight deck was 
equipped with conflict resolution tools that enable them to fully handle the responsibility of weather 
avoidance and maintaining separation between ownship and surrounding traffic. In Concept 2, pilots were 
not responsible for traffic separation, but were provided tools for weather and traffic avoidance. In Concept 
3, flight deck tools allowed pilots to deviate for weather, but conflict detection tools were disabled. In this 
concept pilots were dependent on ground based automation for conflict detection and resolution. Situation 
awareness of the pilots was measured using online probes. Results showed that individual situation 
awareness was highest in Concept 1, where the pilots were most engaged, and lowest in Concept 3, where 
automation was heavily used. These findings suggest that for conflict resolution tasks, situation awareness 
is improved when pilots remain in the decision-making loop. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Rapid increase in air traffic density will exceed the ability 
of the human controller to successfully manage operations in 
the national air space using existing traffic management 
concepts and technology (Joint Planning and Development 
Office, 2007). To meet the capacity demands of the future air 
transportation system, as well as meet or improve safety and 
efficiency standards, human controller tasks like air traffic 
conflict detection and resolution must be supported by, or 
shared with, humans in the flight deck and/or new automation 
technologies. Studies conducted at NASA Ames Research 
Center have shown that controller performance on conflict 
avoidance tasks decreases when traffic load increases, but this 
decrement can lessen when the controller is assisted by 
automation (Prevot, Homola, Mercer, Mainini, & Cabrall, 
2009). However, there may be trade-offs related to situation 
awareness when deploying automation (Parasuraman, 
Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000). The focus of this paper is to 
assess these trade-offs with respect to pilot situation 
awareness under conditions where traffic separation 
responsibility is shared between the flight crew, controllers, 
and automation. 
 
Situation Awareness 
 
Situation awareness (SA) has many definitions. For the 
purpose of this study, situation awareness is “the operator’s 
understanding of the state of the relevant environment and his 
or her ability to anticipate future changes and developments in 
the environment” (European Air Traffic Programme, 2003).  
Endsley (1995) developed an off-line probe technique, 
called the Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique 
(SAGAT) to asses SA. With this technique, task analysis is 
used to identify critical information requirements. Probe 
questions are then developed to capture the operator’s 
awareness of these items. During a simulation, the scenario is 
paused, the screen blanked, and the operator is presented with 
the probe questions. Higher accuracy scores on the questions 
are indicative of higher SA. However, SAGAT has been 
criticized for being too heavily reliant on working memory 
and the process of freezing and resuming a scenario interrupts 
the operator’s primary task (Pierce, Strybel, & Vu, 2008). If 
performance measures are of interest, then this task 
interruption can negatively impact results of a study.  
Alternatively, Durso, Bleckley, and Dattel (2006) 
proposed that SA can be measured based on the operator’s 
understanding of the task environment. That is, the operator 
may not have the information needed to answer the probe 
question in working memory, but may know the location of 
SA relevant information on a display. Knowing where to find 
critical information should yield better situation awareness, 
thus allowing operators access to the display can then improve 
their accuracy for these events. Therefore, SA information 
normally available from the display should be available when 
the operator is being probed. Because the operator is probed 
without stopping the task, SA probes are administered in a 
two-step process. First, a ready prompt is presented. This 
prompt informs operators that a probe question is ready to be 
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presented. If the operator’s workload is not too high, and s/he 
has the resources to answer the probe question, then s/he will 
accept the ready prompt (by hitting a button or saying 
“ready”.) The probe question is then administered right after 
the ready prompt has been accepted. Durso et al. (2006) noted 
that this procedure yields three important measures: a ready 
latency (response latency between the appearance of a ready 
prompt and when the operator indicates that s/he is ready), a 
probe response latency (response latency between the 
presentation of the question and operator response), and a 
probe accuracy score. The ready latency  is considered to be a 
measurement of workload because the operator should be able 
to indicate that s/he is ready more quickly when s/he is not 
busy compared to when s/he is busy. That is, the lower the 
workload, the shorter the ready latencies should be. The probe 
response latency can be used as an indicator of SA because 
the operator should take less time to answer questions when 
the information needed to answer the question is easily 
accessible (either in his/her working memory or s/he knows 
where to look for the information). In other words, shorter 
response times suggest better SA than longer response times.  
 
Automation Affects Situation Awareness 
 
The implementation of automation can vary in terms of 
degree, with each level of increasing automation having an 
impact on situation awareness. In cases where automation is 
completely responsible for undertaking a task, humans may be 
thrown out-of-the-loop leading to complacency (Parasuraman, 
et al., 2000). When complacent, the operator no longer 
proactively seeks to maintain relevant information in the 
environment leading to diminished SA. SA can also be 
diminished when the level of automation provided does not 
adequately support the task or impose high workload. When 
workload is high, cognitive tunneling can occur where the 
operator is forced to selectively attend to the primary task, 
reducing the cognitive resources needed to monitor or process 
other task relevant components (Parasuraman & Wickens, 
2008). However, a performance benefit can be gained from 
reduced workload without trading off SA, if the human 
operator is kept “in the loop” by interacting with automation 
to complete tasks (Dao et al., 2009). 
Dao et al. (2009) examined the impact of varying levels 
of automation on individual pilot SA. Pilots were asked to 
perform a traffic conflict avoidance task with and without the 
support of automation. On manual trials, pilots were given a 
null resolution (no change to route) which they had to modify 
in order to resolve the conflict. On automated trials, pilots 
were given a resolution proposed by an automated system, 
which they could evaluate to ensure that it does solve the 
conflict, but could not modify it for efficiency or other 
preferences. On interactive trials, pilots were given an 
automation-proposed resolution that they could accept as is or 
revise to improve it based on his/her preference. Pilots were 
probed for SA at the end of each trial, when the scenario was 
frozen, but all displays were still active and in sight. Results 
showed that pilot SA was lowest in the automated condition 
when compared to the manual and interactive conditions; 
there were no differences between the manual and interactive 
conditions. Low SA in the automated condition suggests that 
factors such as automation complacency had a significant 
impact on SA. Additionally, comparable SA found in the 
interactive and manual conditions suggest that an interactive, 
human-in-the-loop implementation of automation would fare 
better than at fully automated levels.   
Because Dao et al.’s (2009) study examined short, 2-
minute conflict scenarios, it is not clear whether the same 
affect of automation would be observed when pilots must fly 
longer scenarios that involve different phases of flight as well 
and additional responsibilities.  Thus, the present study 
expands on Dao et al.’s findings by examining pilot SA under 
different levels of automation allocation in more realistic, 80-
minute scenarios. 
 
Current Study 
 
Pilots and controllers engaged in real-time simulations 
focused on en route and arrival operations into Louisville 
International-Standiford Field Airport (SDF). Experimental 
pilots started the scenario in an en-route phase of flight and 
were asked to engage in company spacing during the arrival 
into SDF. At about 2 minutes into each scenario the pilots 
received their spacing interval and lead aircraft from an air 
traffic control (ATC) ground scheduling station. In addition, 
they were to make route modification to avoid hazardous 
weather, and in some conditions, to avoid traffic conflicts. 
Controllers managed 2 high altitude en route sectors, where 
they assisted with weather avoidance, managed en route, 
arrival and departure traffic and provided resolutions to 
aircraft in conflict based on each concept. Situation awareness 
for pilots was examined in three concepts of operations, which 
varied based on the distribution of traffic conflict 
responsibility across human controllers, pilots, and 
automation. Although both pilot and controller SA was a 
focus in this study, this paper will only focus on the pilot’s SA 
across the 3 operational concepts.  
In Concept 1, pilots had onboard conflict detection and 
resolution tools (CD&R) and were responsible for merging 
and spacing, weather avoidance, and conflict resolution (3/4 
of conflicts) between ownship and other aircraft, and the 
controller for the remaining (1/4 of conflicts). In Concept 2, 
pilots also had CD&R tools and were responsible for merging 
and spacing and weather avoidance, but not responsible for 
conflict identification and resolution, which was managed by 
air traffic controllers (3/4 of conflicts) and automation (1/4 of 
conflicts). Concept 3, was similar to Concept 2, except that 
the majority of conflict resolution responsibility was allocated 
to an automation system (3/4 of conflicts) rather than to a 
controller (1/4 of conflicts). In concept 3, unlike 1 and 2 the 
pilot conflict detection was disabled, thus they could only vet 
route changes for weather, but not for traffic.   
Based on results from Dao et al. (2009), it was predicted 
that pilot SA would be greatest when operators were involved 
in the decision making process. Therefore, better pilot SA 
scores were predicted for Concept 1 and 2 than for Concept 3. 
 
  
 
METHOD 
 
Participants 
 
Eight commercial airline pilots with glass cockpit 
experience and two controllers were recruited for this 
experiment. They were compensated $25/hr for their 
participation. 
 
Apparatus 
 
Pilots in the simulation managed a desk top simulator that 
included an interactive 3-D Cockpit Situation Display (CSD) 
developed by the NASA Ames’s Flight Deck Display 
Research Laboratory (see Figure 1). The CSD is a PC-based 
3-D volumetric display that provides pilots with the location 
of surrounding traffic, plus the ability to view planned 4-D 
trajectories (Granada, Dao, Wong, Johnson, & Battiste, 2005). 
Embedded within the CSD was logic that detected and 
highlighted conflicts. Pilots were told that conflict detection 
tool was 100% reliable. In addition, the CSD had pulse 
predictors that emitted synchronous bullets of light that 
traveled along the displayed flight plans at a speed 
proportional to the speeds of the associated aircraft. Using 
these functions (conflict detection and pulse ), a prediction of 
up to 20 minutes into the future could be made, thus providing 
graphical confirmation of ownship proximity to traffic along 
the planned route. 
  
 
Figure 1. 3D Cockpit Situation Display (3D CSD) 
 
Pilots modified the flight path of ownship for weather and 
traffic avoidance using a Route Assessment Tool (RAT; 
Canton, Refai, Johnson, & Battiste, 2005). In Concepts 1 and 
2, the RAT was linked to conflict detection software allowing 
the pilots to find conflict-free paths. In Concept 3, however, 
the conflict detection was disabled. Proposed resolutions were 
color coded in gray to distinguish them from the current route 
(amber if in conflict; magenta in nominal conditions). 
Pilots were also asked to merge and space behind an 
assigned lead aircraft. This task was supported by an 
automated merging and spacing tool, which was based on the 
NASA Langley ASTAR algorithms (Abbott, 2002). When 
engaged, the merging and spacing tool calculated if the 
aircraft would achieve its assigned spacing by the runway. A 
spacing error time, how early or late the aircraft was expected 
to be at the runway, was displayed in seconds. When coupled 
with the auto throttles, the spacing tool gradually modified the 
aircraft speed to achieve the assigned spacing interval. 
In addition to the CSD, pilots were provided with the 
Multi-Aircraft Control System (MACS; Prevot, 2002) which 
was displayed on a separate monitor. MACS provides an 
interactive display that simulates a 747 flight deck controls 
(Figure 2). These flight deck controls included the primary 
flight display (PFD), the mode control panel (MCP), data link 
display and controls for sending/receiving data link messages 
and new routes from the ground or automation, as well as 
flaps and gears for landing procedures. 
 
 
Figure 2. Multi-Aircraft Control System (MACS). 
 
In addition to the pilot interface described briefly above, 
MACS was implemented in controller mode, allowing air 
traffic controllers to track and manage aircraft in their 
assigned sector. Built into MACS was a conflict resolution 
algorithm called the Auto-Resolver (Erzberger, 2006). In all 
concepts, the controller was able to use the Auto-Resolver as a 
tool and request an automated resolution at the controller’s 
discretion. In Concepts 2 and 3, the Auto-Resolver was 
implemented as an agent designed to independently manage a 
percentage of the traffic in the scenario without consent from 
the human controller. The Auto-Resolver agent was disabled 
in Concept 1. In addition to the Auto-Resolver tool, 
controllers used a software based tool called the Trial Planner 
to search for new conflict free routes. Controllers sent new 
routes to the flight deck stations via data link. Pilots loaded 
the new routes through the flight deck data link window, and 
visually examined the new routes on the CSD. 
A separate touch screen tablet computer was also used to 
measure workload and situation awareness. All probe 
questions required a yes/no or multiple choice response (equal 
number of yes/no and multi-choice questions per pilot per 
scenario). 
 
Design and Procedure 
 The independent variable was Concept (Concept 1: Pilot 
Responsible, Concept 2: Controller Responsible, Concept 3: 
Auto-Resolver Agent Responsible) and the dependent 
measures were the three metrics obtained from the probes 
(ready latencies, probe latencies, and probe accuracy). 
Participants completed three blocks of four trials over four 
data collection days. Each block was grouped by Concept and 
was presented once per day. Two trials were repeated on the 
fourth data collection day due to software malfunctions. Each 
trial lasted approximately 80 minutes. Participants received 
classroom training prior to data collection days and were 
provided three practice trials, one with each concept level. 
Pilots were asked to fly an arrival route with a continuous 
descent approach (CDA) into Louisville, Kentucky airport. 
All pilots flew within the same scenario in real time and were 
assigned a spacing interval and lead aircraft two minutes after 
the start of the trial by an automated ground station. 
Additionally, pilots were responsible for weather avoidance in 
all conditions and were trained to maneuver using the RAT. 
Pilots adjusted their route relative to the weather based on 
their own safety criteria and constraints imposed by 
surrounding traffic. 
In Concept 1, pilots independently managed weather and 
traffic separation using the RAT and executed the modified 
flight plan without prior approval from ground. In Concepts 2 
and 3, pilots were required to data link their route 
modification request to ground stations for approval. 
Approvals from the ground came from the Auto-Resolver 
agent when the proposed route was clear of conflicts. 
Proposed routes that were not clear were forwarded to the 
human controller for review and final approval. Onboard 
conflict alerting was provided in Concepts 1 and 2, which 
allowed pilots to vet their proposed route for traffic, whereas 
in Concept 3, conflict alerting was disabled.  
Pilots received a ready prompt for one SA question every 
3 minutes from the start of each trial. Pilots were instructed to 
press the “ready” button on the touch screen panel to reveal 
the question. The simulation did not stop while they were 
answering the questions, and they were allowed to reference 
information on the displays (see Table 1 for example SA 
questions). The display timed out after one minute of non-
responsiveness for both the ready prompt and the probe 
question. Pilots completed a trial when they landed in SDF. 
 
Table 1: Sample Situation Awareness Questions 
In the next 5 minutes how many aircraft will be within 10nm and 2000ft of 
ownship? 
What is the heading of the aircraft closest to you? 
How many times did ownship change speed more than 5 knots in the last 
five minutes? 
Is the difference in heading between ownship and lead less than 10 
degrees? 
 
RESULTS 
 
One participant’s data was removed from analyses due to 
non-compliance with probe procedures. Timeouts, or when 
the participant did not respond to either the ready button or 
select their response (presumably because workload was too 
high to attend to the probe questions) occurred 9% of the time. 
A repeated measures ANOVA of timeouts as a function of 
Concept showed no significant effect (F(2,12) = 1.99, p = 
.18). In Concept 1 (Pilot Responsible), pilots timed out on 
3.8% of the ready prompts compared to 4.6% in Concept 2 
(Controller Responsible) and 7.9% in Concept 3 (Auto-
Resolver Agent Responsible). Although not significant, the 
pattern suggests pilots attended to the probe questions more 
when they were responsible for traffic separation. This pattern 
is consistent with workload findings reported in Ligda et al. 
(submitted). 
A natural log transformation was performed on all 
response latency data, given the non-normal distribution. A 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed for each SA probe 
measure with Concept as a factor (see Table 2 for means and 
standard deviations). The p-values were adjusted using 
Greenhouse-Geisser for violations  
 
Table 2: Means & Standard Deviations of Situation Awareness Probes  
 
Ready Prompt 
Latency (sec) 
Probe 
Response 
Latency (sec) 
% Correct 
 
 Overall 4.73 (7.54) 15.40 (13.61) 81 (39) 
Concept    
Pilot Primary 4.32 (6.57) 13.67 (13.19) 84 (36) 
Controller Primary 4.38 (7.05) 15.78 (13.81) 81 (39) 
Auto-Resolver 
Primary 
5.51 (8.81) 16.81 (13.68) 79 (41) 
n = 7 
 
Analyses of Ready Response Latency 
 
A repeated measure ANOVA for ready response latencies 
(in seconds) was performed, with Concept as a factor. There 
were no significant differences in ready prompt latencies by 
Concept (F(1.15,6.87) = 2.36, p = .17). Pilots took an average 
of 4.36s to respond to the ready prompt in Concept 1, 
compared to 4.43s in Concept 2 and 5.52s in Concept 3. The 
pattern of results was consistent with workload findings 
reported in Ligda et al. (submitted). 
 
Analyses of Probe Response Latency 
 
The natural log of probe response latencies (in seconds) 
was submitted to a repeated-measures ANOVA, with Concept 
as a factor. A significant effect of Concept on probe response 
latency was found, (F(2, 12) = 4.01, p = .046). In Concept 1, 
the probe response time was 13.77s, whereas response time 
was 15.80s for Concept 2 and 16.86s for Concept 3 (see 
Figure 3). Post-hoc comparisons indicated that pilots were 
faster answering the SA questions in Concept 1 compared to 
Concept 3, p = .05. Again, the pattern of the means was in the 
same direction as hypothesized. This suggests that when pilots 
were responsible for separation, they had the lowest probe 
response latency, implying they had the best SA.  
 
Analyses of Percent Correct Responses to SA Probes 
 
The percent correct responses to the SA questions were 
analyzed in a similar manner. There was no effect of Concept, 
F(1.06, 6.33) = 2.34, p = .18; however, the direction of the 
means was consistent with the probe response latency 
findings. In Concept 1, pilots correctly answered 84% of the 
SA probes compared to 81% in Concept 2 and 79% in 
Concept 3. Again, this pattern suggests that pilots have better 
SA when they are responsible for separation.  
 
Figure 3: Response Latencies by Concept 
 
An additional analysis was performed that examined 
probe response latencies as a function of probe accuracy. 
There was a significant difference between probe response 
latency for correct versus incorrect SA questions (t=(1,6) = 
2.95, p = .03). Overall, pilots responded quicker to questions 
they answered correctly (M=14.85, SD=5.29) than questions 
they answered incorrectly (M=18.13, SD=7.63). This is 
consistent with Durso’s (2006) proposition that shorter 
response times suggest better SA.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Pilot situation awareness in the conflict avoidance task 
was improved when they remained in the decision-making 
loop. This finding is consistent with that obtained by Dao et 
al. (2009). The presence of diminished pilot situation 
awareness under conditions where the Auto-Resolver agent 
carried greater responsibility for air traffic separation and 
where pilots did not have onboard CD&R suggests that 
automation mistrust or complacency factors could play a 
greater role in influencing pilot situation awareness. 
SA probe latencies with the online probe technique was 
found to be a more sensitive measure of SA than probe 
accuracy (see also Pierce et al., 2008). The fact that the SA 
probe latencies were able to distinguish between levels of 
automation suggest that they are good tools that can be used in 
the evaluation of operator SA in future ATM concepts. 
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